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The revolutionary events known as the Euromaidan fundamentally 
restructured Ukrainian political life and advanced the culture of politics. As 
with the Orange Revolution, the roots of the Euromaidan can be found in its 
idealism: the Ukrainian people’s desire to create a state wherein the ideals 
associated with freedom, in their broadest sense, are respected. The 
dedication to ideals was more than political rhetoric; it was almost religious. 
This level of dedication helps explain the powerful motivation of those who 
took to the streets in mass protest. This paper examines the important 
differences between the Maidan of 2013-2014 (the Euromaidan) and the 
Maidan of 2004 (the Orange Revolution). A description and explanation of 
the stages of revolution in relation to the Euromaidan are provided, followed 
by a discussion of ideological consensus between political parties. The 
historical basis of the Maidan symbols are also examined, with further 
deliberation on how these symbols were used.  
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Introduction 
The revolutionary events known as the Euromaidan fundamentally restructured Ukrainian 
political life and advanced the culture of politics. As with the Orange Revolution, the roots of 
the Euromaidan can be found in its idealism: the Ukrainian people’s desire to create a state 
wherein the ideals associated with freedom, in their broadest sense, are respected. The dedication 
to ideals was more than political rhetoric; it was almost religious. This level of dedication helps 
explain the powerful motivation of those who took to the streets in mass protest. 
From Orange Revolution to the Euromaidan 
There are a number of important differences between the Maidan of 2013-2014 (the 
Euromaidan) and the Maidan of 2004 (the Orange Revolution). The first difference is that 
during the Orange Revolution, the major “battlegrounds” were the cities of Kyiv and Kharkiv; 
ten years later, the Euromaidan spread to encompass all of Ukraine’s regions. Secondly, the 
protests in 2004 focused on free and fair presidential elections. The Euromaidan is far more 
complex and its demands broader, essentially calling for the reformation of the entire political 
system. 
Thirdly, in 2004, the protesters’ demands focused heavily on an individual, one Viktor 
Yushchenko. Hopes were pinned on him as the primary agent who would affect positive change. 
In 2014, the protesters wanted more than “new faces in;” they called for a complete overhaul of 
the system of government. The notion that one person, or even a small group, can bring about 
meaningful change was relegated to the past. People began to appreciate that change starts with 
them.  
Fourth, the Orange Revolution succeeded after less than a month of protests. The 
Euromaidan has already lasted more than three months at the time this article was written. This 
sustained protest, which was expected to peter out—but has not—was unprecedented in 
Ukraine’s 22-year history as an independent, post-Soviet state.  
Fifth, the political elites governing Ukraine in 2013 were significantly different from the first 
generation of post-Soviet administrators who had been raised in Soviet times. Sixth, the 
Euromaidan saw a broad ideological consensus emerge among a broad range of social groups 
with different demands. That consensus led, in late 2013, to the collapse of anti-Ukrainian 
propaganda based on Soviet myths and stereotypes.  
Stages of Revolution 
It is commonly accepted to trace the origins of the Euromaidan to November 21, 2013, 
when it became clear that the regime of President Victor Yanukovych and the government of 
Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, did not, in fact, plan to sign the association agreement with the 
EU—despite having spent the last three years promising Ukrainians that they would. At the 
eleventh hour, the government backed out. Respected journalist Mustafa Nayyem, a Ukrainian 
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with Afghan and Iranian roots and a mainstay of the political talk show circuit, published an 
appeal on his Facebook page calling for demonstrations to support the signing of the Ukraine-
EU Association Agreement. His appeal “went viral.” Peaceful demonstrations ensued. Some fifty 
thousand people took to the Maidan in Kyiv and rallies were held in other cities.  
At this stage, Ukrainian students, who, in their teens and twenties, had never known life 
under Soviet rule and supported European integration, were the most vocal participants. This 
stage of the Euromaidan ended under cover of darkness in the early morning hours of 
November 30, 2013, when Berkut (“Eagle”) riot police brutally beat students and dispersed their 
encampment in Kyiv’s main square. The following day, over one million protesters took to the 
streets of Kyiv. The protest was no longer just about European integration. It was against a 
government that attacked its own citizens, and defenceless youth at that. During this second 
stage, local Euromaidans appeared across Ukraine. Tensions continued to escalate as riot police 
attacked the Maidan.  
The transition from the second to the third stage of Maidan began on January 16, after the 
so-called “dictatorial laws” (a package of legislation curbing freedom of speech and curtailing 
democratic rights) were passed by the pro-presidential majority in parliament1. The protests 
stopped being strictly peaceful. People donned helmets, put on bulletproof vests and took up 
shields and bats. Molotov cocktails and stones began flying, massive tire fires were lit and 
improvised trebuchets appeared. In response, for the first time in independent Ukraine, the 
government unleashed a nefarious campaign of murder, beating, torture, arrests, and kidnapping 
across the country. Police hunted down civic activists, journalists, and medical workers. But the 
intensification of political repression evoked only greater indignation from society. 
The physical territory of the Maidan in Kyiv was transformed into a fortress with barricades 
and watchtowers.  People started referring to it as “Sich” – the term for command and 
administrative centers the Cossacks created in times of war. The Maidan was a miniature state 
onto itself, with autonomously functioning security, food delivery, medical, and even educational 
systems. It was a territory of freedom, free of corruption and oppressive police presence. The 
term “revolution of dignity” was used to describe this phenomenon of self-organization. 
Numerous civic communities cum organizations sprang up, including the Maidan Self-
Defence, the Auto-Maidan (from “automotive,” mobile units of car owners that became the 
Maidan’s cavalry), “Ne Zlyi Maidan” (the phrase has a double meaning in Ukraine: “Don’t anger 
Maidan” and “Don’t betray Maidan”), Euromaidan SOS, Maidan Open University, the Hospital 
Guard, the “Maidan” All-Ukrainian Association, the Civic Council of Maidan, the Civic 
                                                          
1 Заява Києво-Могилянської академії щодо подій у Верховній Раді України 16 січня 2014 
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Committee for Investigating Human Rights Abuses in Ukraine, and the “MaidanPost” Media 
Guard. 
This explosion of civic mobilization led to the emergence of new leaders, most of them 
civic activists. These included Andriy Parubiy, Ruslana Lyzhychko, Volodymyr Vyatrovych, 
Tetiana Chornovol, Ihor Lutsenko, Dmytro Bulatov, Vasyl Hatsko, Andriy Dzyndzya, Victoria 
Sumar, Serhiy Zhadan, Dmytro Yarosh and many others. The Euromaidan had emerged as a 
powerful political force outside of and independent from the government. 
Ideological Consensus 
For the first time since 1991, there emerged a real, not just declarative, consolidation of 
opposition parties in parliament. Opposition leaders Vitaliy Klychko, Arseniy Yatseniuk, and 
Oleh Tiahnybok agreed upon their most important messages prior to joint press conferences. 
Although they differed on certain issues, the public perceived them as genuinely trying to work 
together and present a united position. Batkivshchyna (“Homeland”) a left-leaning party, Udar 
(Punch) more liberal, and Svoboda (“Freedom”) right-wing (these classifications are relative in the 
realities of post-Soviet politics) found common ground in their opposition to the government 
and desire to create a new state system. 
The unification of their political messaging signified their desire to concentrate on an 
agreed-upon set of goals: the development of an effective state, civil society, and European 
integration. Promotion of their respective ideological positions was secondary. In this, the 
Euromaidan is reminiscent of the experience of the People’s Movement of Ukraine for perestroika 
(Rukh) in the late 1980s, and the Nasha Ukraina (Our Ukraine) coalition of 2002-2004. 
When the All-Ukrainian Association “Maidan” was launched, many compared it to the 
Polish Solidarity movement. Its purpose was to create a broad popular movement whose goals 
were the return of the 2004 Constitution, transparent elections, and complete reformation of 
how the state functions. It is important to note that the Euromaidan movement emerged not as 
a result of conflicts between different regions of Ukraine, as touted by government propaganda, 
but due to a confrontation between the government and the governed.  
Parliamentary parties were not the only ones involved in the Maidan. Extra-parliamentary 
parties, most notably the Democratic Alliance, were active as well. An important force emerged 
that called itself the Right Sector (a part of the Maidan Self-Defence), formed on the basis of 
several organizations, most notably Tryzub (“Trident”) and UNSO (Ukrainian People’s Self-
Defence), both established in the 1990s.  
On the Maidan, one would meet a variety of activists identifying themselves as nationalists, 
or as “the new left” (the latter not yet represented on the Ukrainian political spectrum), 
nationally conscious liberals, and simply “liberals,” as well as representatives of dozens, if not 
hundreds, of different associations. All together, they contributed to the “dialogue of freedom,” 
which was a fundamental characteristic of the Euromaidan. 
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Numerous civic organizations devoted to issues they felt were neglected by the state took to 
the Maidan. Ukraine’s politicians were made to feel how demanding this broad civic movement 
could be. In addition to civic organizations, a lot depended on the will of the Maidan proper. 
During mass rallies held on the Maidan, individual citizens voiced their demands to political and 
civic leaders. On the Maidan stage, clergy representing different Christians, Muslims, and Jews 
prayed together.  
Not only political differences, but also social and national barriers, became secondary on 
the Euromaidan. Ethnic Ukrainians waving their flags were joined by Crimean Tatars, Jews, 
Poles, Belarusians, Georgians, Armenians, and others. The legendary leader of the Crimean Tatar 
people Mustafa Dzhemilyev said he is proud that he is Ukrainian. 
Not only were Russian-speaking Ukrainians welcome on the Maidan, but so were Russians 
and Russian flags. The Maidan organized a “flash mob” of umbrella-wielding protesters to 
support the Russian television channel “Dozhd” (“Rain”). Foreign diplomats, politicians, and 
journalists came out to the Maidan. Students, industrial labourers, farmers, business 
professionals, educators, artists, doctors, and office workers, from Kyiv and across Ukraine, 
stood on the Maidan. National and social revolutions were occurring simultaneously. These 
disparate groups were all united by the idea of overturning the status quo and creating a fair state 
in its stead. 
The Euromaidan was ideologically friendly and open to everyone. There was no division 
based on language or ethnicity. Provocations aimed at exploiting LGBT issues failed repeatedly. 
On the Maidan, LGBT community leaders and the leaders of socially conservative groups found 
common ground2. Many were surprised when the Euromaidan was supported by football fans, 
“ultras,” in all of Ukraine’s regions. In cities controlled by the Party of Regions, the ultras 
protected peaceful protesters from provocateurs. 
At the height of the anti-Maidan provocations, there were repeated attempts to exploit the 
issue of anti-Semitism. In response, the Euromaidan provided security guards3 to synagogues in 
Kyiv after reports that Jews were attacked. Leonid Finberg, the Director of the Kyiv-Mohyla 
Centre of Jewish Studies, criticized those Jewish community representatives who incited hatred. 
Vyacheslav Likhachev placed Euromaidan onto “the Ukrainian Jewish agenda”4 and later wrote 
                                                          
2 Заява ЛГБТ-організацій в Україні щодо чергової спроби використання ЛГБТ для дискредитації 
Євромайдану (A Declaration of LGBT-Organizations in Ukraine regarding the latest attempt to exploit 
the LGBT issue to discredit the Euromaidan): http://lgbt.org.ua/ua/news/show_1046/  
3 Евромайдан берет под охрану синагоги (Euromaidan takes synagogues under its protection): 
http://eajc.org/page16/news42881.html  
4 Вячеслав Лихачев. Майдан: єврейская повестка дня (Maidan: the Jewish Agenda by Vyacheslav Likhachev): 
http://eajc.org/page18/news42507.html  
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the article “The Jewish Division of Ukraine’s Heaven’s Hundred.”5 Josef Zissels, head of the 
Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine, stated that he had not 
encountered any anti-Semitism at Maidan6 and his proclamation “For Your and Our Freedom” 
is historic in Ukrainian-Jewish relations7.  It should not be a secret that Jews joined the ranks of 
the Maidan Self-Defence8. 
Provocations aside, there was no anti-Semitism on the Maidan because there was no 
demand for it. Those responsible for monitoring anti-Semitism in Ukraine confirmed that fact. 
In the early days of the Maidan, one could hear the humorous slogan “Whoever is not jumping is 
a moskal (person from Moscow)” that people chanted as they jumped up and down to keep 
warm. This slogan quickly disappeared after Russian intellectuals appeared in Ukrainian media 
and on the Maidan expressing their support. The Maidan dissipated the myth of Ukrainians’ 
xenophobia. The “traditional” animosity of Ukrainians towards Poles was absent on the Maidan, 
where they stood side-by-side with Ukrainian “right wing radicals.” The Maidan proved to be the 
best way for resolving historical differences. There emerged a mutual respect between peoples 
who hoped to be together in a common Europe. 
The Euromaidan rejected intolerance. This, of course, infuriated its opponents to the point 
of fanaticism. Examples of this can be found in the writings of Volodymyr Ishchenko, whose 
articles disparaged the Maidan from radical left-wing positions. He opposed the position of those 
leading Western intellectuals who supported the Euromaidan and appealed to “support 
Ukrainians and they can help us build a fairer Europe”.9 According to Ishchenko, the 
Yanukovych government in Ukraine may have been bad, but the opposition consisted of 
discredited politicians and the “neo-fascists,” so why change the government? In his opinion, 
Western intellectuals should not have supported the Euromaidan. 
Instead of “European values,” which Ishchenko said were nothing more than an illusion, he 
proposed an alternative program: “Ukrainian progressive grassroots movements and civic 
                                                          
5 Vyacheslav Likhachev. The Jewish Division of Ukraine’s Heaven’s Hundred: 
http://eajc.org/page34/news43797.html  
6 Иосиф Зисельс. Антисемитизм на Майдане – я не вижу того, о чем слышу (Anti-Semitism at Euromaidan: 
What I Hear about, but Never Have Seen by Iosif Zisels) : http://booknik.ru/context/litsa/antisemitizm-na-
mayidane-ya-ne-viju-togo-o-chiom-
lyshu/?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=facebook&utm_campaign=page_booknik  
7 Йосип Зісельс. За Вашу і нашу свободу (For Your and Our Freedom by Iosif Zisels): 
http://www.vaadua.org/news/iosif-zisels-vistup-na-narodnomu-viche-ievromaydan-pid-chas-dnya-
gidnosti  
8 Еврейский герой новой УПА (Jewish Hero of the New UPA): 
http://volnodum.livejournal.com/879170.html  
9 Support Ukrainians and they can help us build a fairer Europe // The Gardian: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/03/support-ukrainians-build-fairer-europe  
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organizations do really need international support in defence of the urgent social-economic 
rights of impoverished Ukrainian citizens and in building their genuine political representation 
from below”10. His “progressive fanaticism” prevented him from understanding the root causes 
that led to the participation of all strata of Ukrainian society in the Euromaidan. Rich people, the 
middle class, and those living below the poverty line took part—not just “the impoverished” to 
whom he appealed in a tone reminiscent of Lenin’s demagogy.   
It is easy to find faults in Ukraine’s political and civic leaders, their actions or programs, 
particularly if one heeds the post-Soviet taboos and disinformation that have inundated 
Ukrainian social consciousness. But the Euromadian brought the issue of national unity in the 
quest for an effective and democratic state to the forefront. Henry IV of France, likely 
borrowing the words of Michel de Montaigne, reminded his people that they are French first of 
all, whether they were Catholics or Huguenots was secondary. Although that sentiment was 
expressed centuries ago, a society’s ability to respect individual freedoms and rid itself of 
corruption is still determined on the national level, within the boundaries of independent nation 
states, and not on a global level. 
The aforementioned ideological consensus does not mean that political competition has 
ceased. Ideological discussions continue. But the important thing is that Ukrainian liberals, right- 
and left-wing politicians and activists, as well as apolitical citizens, have become united in the 
struggle to establish a new and fair state. One of the Euromaidan’s enduring slogans is “Razom – 
Syla!” (“Together, we’re a Force!”). A new civil society is being created. Everyone can find a spot 
on the Euromaidan’s barricades. In this way, political, inter-confessional, inter-cultural, and inter-
ethnic dialogues continue on the Maidan. In general terms, this is the ideology of a new state’s 
formation. 
Historical Basis of the Maidan’s Symbols 
The Euromaidan is the continuation of the ongoing national liberation struggle of the 
Ukrainian people. Declared in 1991, independent statehood did not mean the establishment of 
an effective state, and corruption grew to menacing proportions. All of the negative processes in 
Ukraine occurred at the same time Putin’s Russia embarked on its campaign to restore the 
“Great Russian Empire” within the boundaries of the former USSR. Information warfare against 
Ukraine, economic intimidation, the unpunished activities of Russian secret services and their 
Ukrainian “fifth column” agents directly undermined Ukraine’s independent statehood. 
By pursuing these policies in its “near abroad,” the Russian government is trying to distract 
its own citizens from social problems that this very government cannot resolve. In terms of 
ideology, Putin’s system has tried to promote the idea of the Ruskii Mir (“Russian World”) 
among Ukrainians. This campaign has been largely unsuccessful, but has had destructive effects. 
                                                          
10 Volodymyr Ishchenko. Support Ukrainians but do not legitimize the far-right and discredited politicians! 
http://www.criticatac.ro/lefteast/support-ukrainians-but-not-far-right  
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The tenets of this new ideology are that Ukrainians and Russians are really one people who share 
a “common history,” the imperial “greatness” of the Russian Tsars, the “glory” of the Soviet 
period (particularly exploiting the ideological construct of the “Great Patriotic War”) and the 
“consolidating” power of Russian Orthodox Christianity (which is once again serving a 
repressive state system). 
We have grown accustomed to ignoring the fact that the Second World War destroyed only 
one of the two most totalitarian systems Europe has known – German Nazism. But Soviet 
totalitarianism, or “Russian Communism,” to borrow a term from Kyiv philosopher Mykola 
Berdiayev, has survived. It continues along the same lines, today under the guise of “Putinism” 
with Tsarist-Leninist-Stalinist ideological underpinnings. It is a source of global concern because 
of its aggressive nature. Timothy Snyder has equated Nazism and Communism in the context of 
the Euromaidan as an ideological phenomenon. He has expressed concern over the Kremlin’s 
Eurasian ideology as totalitarian and neo-Bolshevik.  
According to French intellectual Bernard-Henri Lévy, all Europeans should feel themselves 
“Ukrainians.” Speaking on the Maidan in Kyiv, he said, “In Paris, there is the Bastille Square, 
which became the cradle of the French nation. You have the Maidan, where the Ukrainian 
nation is now being born.” 11 This statement is only partially true. Ukrainian independence didn’t 
fall from the sky in 1991. It was not the result of evolutionary processes within the USSR, but a 
result of the bitter struggle of many generations of Ukrainians. The Russian Empire attempted to 
discredit the names of those leaders who were symbols of our national liberation struggle. 
Ukrainians were labelled mazepintsy, petlurivtsy, and banderivtsy (after the names of historic figures 
Ivan Mazepa, Symon Petlura, and Stepan Bandera) in an extremely pejorative and demonizing 
sense.  
“Glory to Ukraine! – Glory to Heroes!” became the Maidan’s slogan. It’s repeated 
constantly by representatives of different political ideologies in all regions of Ukraine. It was 
inherited from the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army 
(UPA). It is based on the idea that national and social liberation in Ukraine can be established 
only by creating “a Ukrainian Independent Unified State”. The concept of “the Ukrainian unified 
state” was critical in the 20th century when half of Ukraine, known as “Great Ukraine” was under 
Russia, and the western Ukrainian lands were, at different times, under Austria-Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, and Hungary. 
The struggle for genuine independence resumed on the Euromaidan, and quickly adopted 
the ideological legacy, organizational, and structural forms of 20th Century Ukrainian nationalism, 
which is today performing an integrative function for society as a whole. 
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Andreas Umland, a researcher of contemporary totalitarian movements, erred when he 
relegated the above mentioned slogan to belong to “specifically nationalistic topics, symbols and 
slogans.” 12 It gained popularity not because it was repeated countless times from the Maidan 
stage and not because of some campaign of ethnic superiority. Its popularity stems from its 
association with the defiant spirit of a struggle against all odds. Actually, the people of Kyiv took 
up the slogan “Glory to Ukraine! – Glory to her heroes!” decades earlier during Gorbachev’s 
perestroika. It was first publicly pronounced by Vyacheslav Chornovil at Sofiyivska Square during 
a demonstration in 1989. 
“Paranoid interpretations,” to borrow a term from Umberto Eco, are often verbalized. One 
such interpretation is the equation of the popular Euromaidan slogan “Ukraine above all!” and 
the Nazi slogan “Deutschland uber alles!” The researchers shouldn’t try to compare “apples and 
oranges;” instead, they could listen to the interpretation offered by Auto-Maidan speaker Serhiy 
Koba who on February 23 declared at the Maidan stage that his organization had gone into 
opposition to those people who a mere few days earlier were in opposition to Yanukovych, in 
order to oversee the new government’s activities. He called out to the masses gathered before 
the stage: “Ukraine!”, and Maidan replied: “Above all!” “That is what every official of the new 
government must remember,” – the speaker said, - “they must work for the interests of the state, 
not for their own pockets.” Like this one, all Maidan slogans have a social, not a discriminatory 
meaning. 
The outstanding historian Norman Davies mentioned “a vexatious ideological trap,” in 
which the UPA and other participants of the Resistance movements against the Nazi in Eastern 
Europe found themselves, “as long as struggling for national liberty demanded it of them, to 
fight not only against Hitler, but also against Stalin” 13. The latter, as we know, has the image – 
even today – of a great anti-fascist and the West’s ally in the Second World War. Unfortunately, 
many experts and politicians take a straight line view that if the UPA fought against the USSR, it 
should be considered a supporter of national-socialism, but this is completely absurd. 
There are respectable works printed in English, by Orest Subtelny14 and Paul Robert 
Magocsi15 in particular, that testify that the UPA was established in 1942 as an army to fight 
against the Hitlerian occupation forces. The nationalistic resistance continued active struggle 
                                                          
12 Andreas Umland. Is Tiahnybok a Patriot? How the Spread of Banderite Slogans and Symbols Undermines 
Ukrainian Nation-Building // Foreign Policy Journal: 
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/01/01/is-tiahnybok-a-patriot-how-the-spread-of-banderite-
slogans-and-symbols-undermines-ukrainian-nation-building/  
13 Дейвіс Н. Европа. Історія. – Київ, 2000. – C. 1064. 
14 Subtelny Orest. Ukraine. A History. – Published by the University of Toronto Press in association with the 
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. – Toronto, Buffalo, London. – 1988. – p. 473. 
15 Magocsi Paul Robert. A History of Ukraine. The Land and Its People. – Toronto, Buffalo, London. – 
University of Toronto Press. – 2010. – p. 679. 
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against Russian communism until the mid-1950s. Today, many descendants of participants or 
supporters of this movement have come to the Maidan. 
The rebirth of symbols of national liberty was greatly advanced by the “Revolution on 
Granite” led by students in 1990. To wit, journalists from the Vzgliad (View) Soviet Union-wide 
progressive TV program promised the Ukrainian students that they’d pay special attention to 
national symbols in their coverage of the protests, but the production version of the report 
avoided the issue of symbols. Soon thereafter, at the beginning of 1990s, Yaroslava Stetsko 
thanked Vyacheslav Chornovil for promoting the UPA slogan. The Ukrainian dissident replied 
that this slogan unites various generations of those who struggle for Ukraine’s freedom. 
The Euromaidan should be treated within the context of the Ukrainian people’s national 
liberation struggle. Its main value is unity in diversity. As it turned out, it is hard to formulate in 
brief what unites all the participants. It’s less about interests (everyone has his or her own) and 
more about all individuals striving to feel themselves a people in their own state. Thus the 
Euromaidan is often called a revolution of dignity. After 23 years of independence, Ukraine 
remains a state under threat, a fairly unstable country with a transitional society, depressed 
economy, high level of corruption, and blurred system of values. 
By resorting to the slogan “Glory to Ukraine! – Glory to Heroes!” the Euromaidan 
undertook to defend and develop the Ukrainian state. Accusing Maidan activists of extremism is 
either a provocation or an incompetent statement16. Indeed, after February 20, when the number 
of persons killed in Kyiv street fighting during an offensive by the Maidan Self-Defense went 
past one hundred, the slogan gained a special meaning, in particular among the media. The 
Maidan called them Heaven’s Hundred. The Heroes of the Maidan died for Ukraine. Europeans 
should remember that those Heroes were also defending European values. The fighters of 
Heaven’s Hundred struggled heroically, as their predecessors did as well.   
Two Opposing Symbols 
To counter the bright, polyphonic symbols of the Euromaidan, to enable ideological 
confrontation, special anti-symbols were used by the Maidan’s enemies. The best known of these 
was, as should have been expected, of imperialist Putinite origin. This anti-symbol was the so-
called “Georgian Ribbon.” It derived from the defunct Tsarist Order of St. George the Victor, 
and claimed to symbolize a warrior’s courage and a particularly Russian patriotism. At the same 
time, it resembles the so-called “Guardian Ribbon” of the Soviet period. Production and 
distribution of this anti-symbol began in 2005, and yet took place in many countries, with broad 
Russian backing. 
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This marketing vehicle does not have anything in common with honouring the memory of 
the Second World War heroes who really contributed to the victory over Nazism. The Georgian 
ribbon was not popularized in the Soviet period. The main task of this campaign is to find a 
simple symbol capable of ideologically uniting the military “greatness” of the Russian Empire 
before and after 1917, and to give its supporters a mass and affordable way to identify 
themselves in public as Russian chauvinists. Now this symbol is being exported to Ukraine under 
the pretext of combatting the “fascistic” orientation of Maidan. 
In point of fact, however, the Georgian ribbon is just a symbol of the anti-humanism and 
totalitarianism of the Russian Empire, neither discredited by postwar denazification, as was done 
in Germany, nor criminalized and prosecuted at Nurenberg. Its task is to mark visually the 
territory occupied by the aggressive idea of the “Russian World,” which is a reincarnation of 
communism and fascism, threatening the ideas of humanity, national self-identification, freedom, 
and civil society. This restored imperial symbolic is opposed by the symbols of national 
liberation, including the slogan “Glory to Ukraine! – Glory to Heroes!” 
The Euromaidan should be considered not a threat to Russia, but rather a threat to Russian 
autocracy. In January 2012, the well-known Russian intellectual Yuriy Afanasiev, speaking at 
Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, said that Russia’s main problem is not Putin himself, but the autocracy 
(Putinism), which must be fully terminated. All Russian intellectuals, who spoke from the scene 
at Euromaidan and commended it to media, are aware of that. Now, participants of opposition 
meetings in Moscow chant “Bandu Het’!” (“Away with the Band!”) in Ukrainian. This is in fact an 
export of democracy, of Ukrainian national and political culture.  
The Russian intervention has most clearly displayed the Euromaidan as an ideological 
phenomenon. Ukrainians have shown themselves surprisingly united. Timothy Snyder, one of 
the most capable Ukraine scholars, was somewhat astounded by this “unification of the 
unconnectable”17 (that is, the collaboration of different groups with seemingly opposite 
ideological orientation and social foundations). That’s how it was on the Maidan until the regime 
of Viktor Yanukovych was taken down, so it happened again later, when Russian occupiers 
invaded Ukrainian territory. These events did not bring on an anti-Russian hysteria. They 
showed, indeed, that Ukrainians are very diverse, but at once united. Now our views are very 
                                                          
17 Timothy Snyder. Ukraine: The Haze of Propaganda // The New York Review of Books: 
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/mar/01/ukraine-haze-propaganda/ 
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broad or even universal. Only a mature nation can afford such a display. The occupiers arrived 
too late. 
_________________________________________ 
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